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Abstract 
This paper looks at the reaction by industry insiders, industry analysts and competing firms, 
to the announcement of M&As that took place in the European Union financial industry in 
the period 1998-2006. Analysts covering firms involved in an M&A transaction do not 
significantly alter their recommendation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
transaction on average is “fairly priced” and that stock market prices reflect all relevant 
information on the assets. We also find that the correlation between excess returns for 
merging and competing firms is positive and, in some cases, significantly higher for 
domestic mergers than for international deals. This is consistent with the idea that domestic 
deals are more likely to have a negative impact on industry competition. 
JEL classification: G20; G34. 
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; analysts recommendations; rival firms. 
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1 Introduction 
The integration of the financial industry in the European Union is at the forefront of the public 
policy debate. Integration of financial markets is perceived as an essential part of the process 
of real economic integration within European markets. The European financial industry has 
followed a cyclical pattern of M&A activity during the last decade. M&A activity was very 
intense during the late nineties and decreased considerably from 2001 to 2003, increasing its 
pace again in 2004 to the present. Interestingly, most transactions within the European Union 
have taken place among domestic firms. Moreover, international M&As in the banking 
industry until recently had been carried out more often with banks from outside the euro-zone 
than within banks from different euro area countries [Hartmann et al. (2003)]. This pattern has 
shifted in the last two years. A few major international transactions, such as the successful 
purchases by Banco Santander of Abbey National Bank in the UK, by Unicredito of HVB in 
Germany, by ABN Amro of Antonvenetta and by BNP Paribas of BNL in Italy and the failed 
attempt of BBVA in Italy have increased the interest in the pattern of concentration at the 
European level. At the same time, the mixed failure in the attempts by BBVA and ABN Amro 
to acquire Italian banks, in a context of sharp opposition by the Italian banking establishment1, 
have also highlighted how integration at the European level is still subject to considerable 
institutional and nationalistic barriers [European Commission (2005)]. 
The underlying motives for engaging in an M&A transaction have to deal with 
the efficiency gains reflected in lower costs and higher profits involved in the merger, the 
geographical diversification generated from the merger, the improvement in the competitive 
position, and the increase in the ability to generate value to consumer by the cross-selling 
of products. In addition, pre-emption motives may be behind some mergers that appear to 
reduce profits [Stennek, (2006)]2. Studies of merger activity point to efficiency gains as 
the major source of value creation, while the net increase in revenue generated from the 
merger tends to be small [Houston and Ryngaert (1994)]. However, it is difficult to find 
strong statistical evidence for the existence of these efficiency gains. Studies looking at the 
source of value creation in M&As in the European financial industry are inconclusive at best. 
In a study of value creation to shareholders upon announcement of an M&A transaction 
Beitel and Schiereck (2001) report that returns to shareholders of the acquiring firm tend 
to be negative as the size of the acquiring bank increases. In a similar event study analysis 
of 54 M&As deals in 13 European banking markets, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) find a 
positive and significant increase in stock market value at the time of the deal announcement 
except in the subsample of cross-border deals3. Campa and Hernando (2006) find a 
post-merger improvement in the profitability performance of acquired banks relative to the 
                                                                          
1. This opposition is not only circumscribed to the banking establishment. Thus, for instance, the recent approval by the 
Bank of Italy of the acquisition of BNL by BNP has also generated criticisms among political parties and consumer 
associations. 
2. The underlying idea is that in some cases the relevant alternative to which compare the potential benefits of a 
merger deal from the acquirer’s point of view is an alliance of their competitors rather than the absence of any merger 
process. In other words, when certain developments increases the likelihood of merger processes in a given industry, 
being an insider might reduce profits less than being an outsider. 
3. Similarly, Campa and Hernando (2004) show that international mergers within Europe destroy shareholder value, 
especially in regulated industries. 
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industry but this performance improvement only appears two years after the completion of 
the transaction4. 
This lack of performance in M&A transactions in the financial industry has raised 
concerns on the competitive outcome that this concentration may imply. Concentration in 
the financial industry in many European countries has significantly increased. The share of 
total banking assets accounted by the five largest institutions (the C5 concentration ratio) 
in small countries such as Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands was above 80% in 2005. 
Concentration has also increased in all major national markets of the euro area over the 
period 1997-2005. In Spain the C5 ratio increased by 10 percentage points (from 32% 
to 42%); in France, by 14 p.p. (from 40% to 54%); in Germany, by 5 p.p. (from 17% to 22%) 
and in Italy, by 2 p.p. (from 25% to 27%). Despite this increase in concentration at the 
national level concentration in the euro area as a single market is markedly lower5. Bikker and 
Wesseling (2003) report that the C5 concentration ratio defined for the euro area increased 
by 4 pp, from 12% in 1996 to 16% in 2001. Nevertheless, this increase in concentration 
ratios does not necessarily reflect lower competition. In fact, the rising trend in the share of 
foreign credit institutions in local markets, the slight contraction in net interest margins and 
the improvement in efficiency ratios indicate a strengthening of competition in European 
banking markets [Allen et al. (2005)]. These developments are more likely caused by the 
development of parallel trends affecting competition beyond domestic consolidation such as 
the implementation of new technologies and regulatory changes in the industry. 
In this paper we assess the magnitude of value creation associated to merger deals 
and further analyze the underlying motives for recent mergers in the European financial 
sector. In particular, we go beyond shareholder value creation for the firms involved and 
evaluate value creation in the industry. We use an indirect approach: rather than focusing on 
the reaction of the prices of the merging firms upon the deal announcement, we look at the 
response of other participants in the market. We first look at the changes in 
recommendations by industry analysts and then at the stock price reaction of the rival 
companies. We follow an event study methodology based on stock prices reaction to merger 
announcements. This strategy complements other approaches used in the industrial 
organization literature based on the analysis of the changes in balance-sheets, costs or profits 
resulting from merger processes. The event study methodology is well suited to avoid the 
problem of holding constant other factors that are usually present in other ex-post studies of 
merger effects [Caves (1989)]. 
One of the weaknesses often highlighted of event-study results is that stock 
market prices over short windows may not be a good reflection of the full value of the merger. 
This critique has two variants. Skeptics of the efficiency of financial markets view event 
studies focus on short-term windows around announcement as a poor reflection of the true 
value added for the firms involved in these complex transactions6. A second line of critique 
does not focus on the methodology but rather on the narrow definition of value creation. 
Event studies, with their focus on shareholder value creation for the firms involved, are only a 
partial measure of the economic value created from a transaction. In particular, it does not 
                                                                          
4. More detailed overviews of the developments in the M&A activity in the EU financial sector may be found 
in ECB (2000, 2004a, 2004b and 2005), Cabral et al. (2002), Hartmann et al. (2003), and Bikker and Wesseling (2003). 
5. See ECB (2004a) for a detailed overview of recent developments on EU banking structure and Gual (2004) 
and Pérez, Salas and Saurina (2005) for an assessment of the process of integration of EU banking markets. 
6. Campa and Hernando (2006) evaluate the changes in operating performance of the banks involved in these 
transactions up to five years after the merger. The evidence indicates that there is only an increase in the return on 
equity of the target firm starting two years after the completion of the transaction. 
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take into account the resulting value created to consumers through competition enhancement 
in the industry. Therefore, the results from this type of analysis are likely to provide poor 
guidance for the evaluation of the attractiveness of these transactions. 
We tackle the first critique in two ways. First, we look at a longer time horizon, 
one-year, to evaluate the stock market performance and its implication from the merger. 
Most important, we go further and study the changes in perception by industry analysts 
of the expected returns to shareholders after the announcement. Changes in analyst 
recommendations have been shown to be predictors of future excess performance. To the 
extent that consensus exists that market prices do not reflect the expected returns from 
the merger, analysts as informed agents should change their recommendations 
on these stocks. We find little evidence in this regard. Analysts do not alter their 
recommendations in a manner significantly different after the merger announcement 
than around other periods in which no similar news occur. This evidence suggests that 
stock market prices react fairly fast to all the relevant information for expected returns from 
the merger announcement. 
In the second part of the paper we confront the second critique above. We analyze 
whether the increase in concentration arising from the domestic consolidation process that 
has taken place has resulted in a significant change in the competitive environment in 
the financial industry. We evaluate the stock-market reaction by competing firms around the 
announcement of a transaction. There is a long history starting with Eckbo (1983) and 
Stillman (1983) of looking at the reaction of the stock market price of competing firms to 
evaluate the likely gains from a merger7. The key point in this literature is that when a merger 
is expected to decrease competition, industry margins are expected to increase and 
therefore, returns to shareholders of all the firms in the industry should also increase. 
However, when the merger is expected to foster competition, its announcement should 
cause a fall in the stock market price of competing firms. We follow this literature 
and evaluate the reaction by competing firm stocks around a merger announcement. 
We generally find a positive correlation between excess returns of the merging firms and 
those of their competitors, which indicates that market power might increase as a result 
of these transactions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample of M&As deals 
used in the event studies, and the details on the data from competing firms and analysts 
coverage. Section 3 presents the results on the reaction by analysts’ recommendations upon 
announcement. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis on excess returns of competing 
firms around announcements. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
                                                                          
7. See also Eckbo (1992) and Singal (1996). 
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2 Sample of M&A transactions 
To evaluate the reactions by industry insiders upon the announcement of an M&A transaction 
we focus on the events around the announcement of an M&A transaction in the European 
Union8 (EU) during the period 1998-2006. The selected sample includes M&A transactions 
announced within the EU in which both firms involved in the transaction were financial firms 
(within SIC 60 to 67) and both were publicly traded companies. We excluded those deals 
in which either the target or the acquirer was a real state company and those transactions in 
which the buyer already owned 50% of the targeted company. We also decided to drop 
from the sample some outliers in terms of the excess returns of either the acquirer 
or the target firms9. As a result we conclude with a final sample of 218 transactions. Table 1 
provides some information on the sample composition. The vast majority of these 
transactions (159) were domestic transactions, i.e. involved two institutions from the same 
country. The sample varied significantly by segment within the financial industry. Over half 
of the sample (119 acquirers) included depository institutions within the European Union, 
followed by holdings and other financial firms (45 acquirers) and by insurance companies (34). 
We also present results for a sample of 125 banking deals, i.e. transactions in which both 
institutions involved are depositary institutions10. 
We performed event studies around the announcement date of the merger (t).  
We obtained the cumulative excess returns to the target and acquirer through three 
distinct periods around this date: pre-announcement period ([t-90, t-1]), announcement 
period ([t-1, t+1]) and post-announcement period ([t-1, t+30]). We also looked at 
the cumulative excess return to the acquirer a year after the merger announcement 
([t-1, t+360]). Cumulative excess returns are defined as the difference between total 
shareholder return of the company involved during the event window minus the return to 
the national stock market index during that period11. This sample and information of excess 
returns conforms our reference sample for competing firms and analysts coverage. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics on excess returns to targets and acquirers. 
Target companies experienced a positive excess return around the announcement of 
the merger. This excess return was on average 3.38% from the day prior to the merger 
announcement to the day after the announcement. An asymmetry is observed in the 
computed excess returns prior and after the announcement. There are significant run-up 
returns. Excess returns over the period [t-90, t-1] are positive. No additional excess return is 
observed after the first day of the announcement. The average excess return in the window 
[t-1, t+30] was 1.73% that is substantially lower than the average excess return observed 
over the shorter window [t-1, t+1]. Moreover, long run excess returns are not significant. 
The distribution of excess returns is quite asymmetric and median excess returns tend to be 
                                                                          
8. Throughout this paper, we have considered the European Union of 15 countries, before enlargement on 1 May 2004. 
9. More precisely, we drop a deal from the sample if the excess returns of either the target or the acquirer 
computed for different windows around the announcement date (t) exceed 100%. In particular, we consider the following 
windows: [t-90, t-1], [t-1, t+1], and [t-1, t+30]. 
10. For this purpose, we use a broad definition of banking institution including: depository institutions (SIC 60), 
nondepository credit institutions (SIC 61), security and commodity brokers and services (SIC 62),and holdings and 
investment offices (SIC 671 and 672). 
11. We also calculated excess returns as the difference between actual returns and a measure of expected 
returns calculated using the CAPM during the six months prior to the event window and the results were 
qualitatively similar. Additionally, we also used the financial industry index as the relevant market index. This also 
had no substantial implications on the results. See Campa and Hernando (2006) for details. 
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smaller. There is a higher proportion of target firms that experience positive excess returns 
with this proportion fluctuating, depending on the window, between 51% and 60% of all 
targets. 
For acquirers the distribution of excess returns around announcement is substantially 
different. Average excess returns are negative, with the exception of the pre-announcement 
window, and of the order of -1%. There does not appear to be any significant excess 
return during the run-up period prior to announcement. Long-run returns are also negative 
although unsignificant. Excess returns to acquirers experienced a wide dispersion around 
the average number. The median excess return is very close to zero in most cases. 
In fact, the percentage of acquirers that experienced positive excess returns is around 50% 
for all windows. 
We compare excess returns in terms of the geographical scope of the merger and 
the size of the deal, measured by the joint market capitalization of the merging companies. 
Value creation is expected to be lower in cross-border deals. Such deals usually offer lower 
potential synergies than domestic deals and are less likely to affect industry competition. 
Cross-country differences in safety net characteristics that result in different risk-taking 
activities could also give rise to some premia for institutions moving to countries with a 
different degree of safety net [Hovakimian et al. (2003)]. We find that excess returns to 
targets are substantially lower in cross-border mergers than in domestic deals, especially 
when measured by median values. The magnitude of this difference is especially high over 
the pre-announcement window and over the long-run post-announcement window. Average 
and median excess returns to targets are higher than those to acquirers in domestic mergers. 
The difference in excess returns for acquirers between domestic and international deals 
depends on the window considered. 
 In terms of deal size, small (large) mergers include those transactions in the lower 
(upper) quartile of the distribution. The differences by size are quite striking, especially in the 
long-run. Short-run excess returns to targets are somewhat higher in small deals while 
the opposite is true for acquirers. The differences are much larger over the long-run window. 
Small deals had an average (median) excess return for shareholders of the target firm of -1% 
(-7%) and an average (median) excess return of -11% (-2%) for the shareholders of the 
acquirer. In contrast, excess returns in large deals were substantially higher both for 
targets and acquirers: average (median) excess return were 2% (4%) for shareholders of 
the target firms and 6% (7%) for those of the acquiring companies. These results are 
consistent with Kane (2000) who suggests that large deals generate high excess returns 
because the resulting institution may benefit from being “too big to discipline adequately”. 
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3 Analysts’ recommendations 
Information from analysts’ recommendations has been used often as a source of information 
for predicting returns. There is consensus in the literature that the level of analysts’ 
recommendations, although it may help in predicting future returns, does not result in 
strategies that could be implemented to generate excess returns. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols 
and Trueman (2001) show in a large sample of over 360,000 analysts’ recommendations that 
buying a portfolio of firms with a buy recommendation resulted in a higher return than buying 
a portfolio of firms with a sell recommendation. However, the strategy of shorting the latter 
portfolio to buy the portfolio of highly recommended firms did not result in positive excess 
returns after transaction costs. While investment strategies based on analyst consensus do 
not generate excess returns, positive excess returns are observed when the strategy picks 
portfolios based on changes in recommendations by analysts. Along this line, Stickel (1995) 
and Womack (1996) have documented that positive (negative) changes in analysts’ 
recommendations are accompanied by positive (negative) returns at the time of their release. 
Moreover, Boni and Womack (2006) show that changes by analyst in their recommendations 
(upgrades or downgrades) are especially useful in predicting relative performance of a 
firm within its industry. However, analyst recommendations are not good predictors 
of future relative returns across industries. Overall, the literature suggest that changes in 
analysts’ recommendations appear to be a predictor of future returns, after controlling 
for a number of relevant stock characteristics. 
Analysts often change their recommendations upon the announcement of a major 
event affecting the firm. M&A transactions are one clear candidate for such an event that 
can produce a drastic variation in the business perspective of the firms involved and 
the expected return on their respective stock. We therefore would expect that analysts’ 
reactions to the announcement of a merger may provide useful information on the value of the 
merger to investors. 
We have compiled a database on analysts’ recommendations of the companies 
involved in M&As deals. The database summarizes for every firm, every month, the ratings 
by all analysts covering the firm in a scale of one to five. Each observation corresponds to 
analysts recommendations for a given company and month (the Thursday before the third 
Friday of every month). The database covers the period 1997-2006. We were able to find 
information for 159 acquirers and 140 targets of the 218 transactions in our sample. For each 
observation, we have information on the number of analysts that follow the stock, the mean, 
median and standard deviation of the company recommendation and the number of analysts 
that have upgraded/downgraded the firm relative to the previous month12. The ratings are 
based on the expected stock performance of the firm by analysts. A value of one represents 
the highest expected performance while five the lowest13. 
It is important to stress that these data do not measure the quality of the companies 
in absolute terms but in relation to their market price. Thus, a good recommendation means 
that the analyst considers that the company is undervalued in the market and therefore 
                                                                          
12. For the deals announced over the period 2003-2006 we only know the average number of analysts following 
the stock and the average score. 
13. More precisely, the set of recommendations, each with an assigned numeric value, is as follows: (1) strong buy, 
(2) buy, (3) hold, (4) underperform, and (5) sell. 
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he/she recommends buying this share at the current price. Similarly, a change in the 
recommendation around the announcement date can be interpreted as the analyst 
perception of how the deal is going to affect the performance of the company. Nevertheless, 
changes in recommendations have to be interpreted with caution as they probably are 
accompanied by changes in shares prices. 
Table 3 reports the evidence on analysts recommendations the month prior to 
the announcement of the deal. Three conclusions can be extracted from this evidence. 
First, the average recommendation for acquirers is slightly better than that for targets, 
although the difference is only marginally significant. This difference between average 
recommendations of targets and acquirers is mainly due to the ratings of companies 
involved in cross-border deals. Second, acquirers in international mergers had better ratings 
than their targets in over 60% of the cases. In contrast, the average recommendation of both 
firms in domestic transactions is quite similar. Third, the average recommendation for targets 
is not significantly different around the merger announcement from what is observed in 
non-announcement periods. The last three rows of Table 3 report the mean and the median 
of average recommendations for the target and acquirer firms in the months in which they 
were not involved in a transaction14. The mean (median) of average recommendations for 
target firms in non-announcement periods was 2.62 (2.62) while in the periods around 
which the takeover took place was 2.59 (2.65). One cannot conclude from this evidence that 
target firms get acquired when analysts consider that the firm is undervalued. 
Focusing only in the subset of banking deals, there is no significant difference in 
the average score between targets and acquirers. This is explained by slightly better 
recommendations for targets in domestic deals and significantly better ratings for acquirers in 
cross-border deals. Moreover, average recommendations for targets in domestic deals are 
significantly better than recommendations during the periods in which no transaction takes 
place. The opposite is true in cross-border deals. 
As discussed above, changes in analyst recommendations are better in 
predicting excess returns. Therefore, a comparison of changes in recommendations around 
the announcement dates is potentially more informative than the analysis of average 
recommendations performed so far. 
Table 4 reports statistics on changes in recommendations15. We look at the 
last recommendation prior to the announcement of the transaction and focus on 
the number of analysts covering the stock that have changed their recommendation. 
We do the same thing for the first set of analysts’ recommendations after the announcement 
of the merger. Finally, to capture any possible delays in analysts’ recommendations, 
we report also the same statistics for the cumulative information up to four months after 
the announcement. We split the results in four groups: observations where no analyst 
has changed its assessment, observations where all analysts changing their assessment 
indicate a downgrade, observations where all analysts changing their assessment indicate an 
upgrade and, finally, observations where there are analysts changing their recommendations 
in opposite directions. In the last column of the table we provide the analog values for 
those variables during the 1997 to 2003 period for the non-announcement periods. This last 
                                                                          
14. Non-announcement periods include all observations preceding the last three recommendations before 
announcement and all observations following the first four recommendations after announcement. 
15. Results reported in this table are obtained from the sample of deals announced over the period 1998-2003, 
as the information on changes in recommendations is not available for the most recent transactions. 
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column can be seen as a benchmark for comparison on the significance of these changes 
in recommendations. The distribution of observations right before the merger according to 
the existence of changes in recommendations and the sign of these changes is very similar 
to the distribution of observations in non-announcement periods. In these non-announcement 
periods, the number of companies/periods pairs that display a change in a recommendation 
is approximately one third. This number gets split in around 12% that display uniform 
downgrades, 11% that show uniform upgrades and 10% that display changes in 
recommendations of both signs16. Interestingly, both in the only upgrades and the only 
downgrades subsamples, the percentages of analyst changing their recommendations is just 
around 10%. Moreover, the fraction of observations where more than 20% (or 50%) of 
analysts change recommendation is very small. 
The fraction of observations without changes in the period just prior to 
announcement is smaller for acquirers. However, these firms experience a higher fraction 
of uniform upgrading. In the case of targets, the fraction of observations with changes of 
recommendations of opposite sign is lower. Moreover, for those observations with uniform 
downgrading the average fraction of analysts changing their recommendations (22%) is 
higher than in the case of non-announcement observations (around 10%). 
More surprisingly, the distribution of changes in recommendations after the 
announcement, and the sign of these changes, is again very similar to the distribution of 
observations in non-announcement periods. The fraction of target observations with changes 
of recommendations of opposite sign is lower, especially for the mergers involving banks. 
There is a higher fraction of uniform upgrading and a lower fraction of uniform downgrading 
among acquiring firms but in this case the average fraction of analysts changing their 
recommendations is higher. 
Finally, looking at the changes in recommendations over the first four months after 
the announcement of the deal we observe that the proportion of observations without 
changes in recommendations is smaller. This is not surprising given the longer length of the 
time interval. However, the fraction of observations with changes of recommendations of 
opposite sign is higher suggesting that there is no consensus among analysts even four 
months after the announcement of the transaction. 
To summarize, changes in recommendations on firms involved in merger deals are 
not exceptionally frequent. There are no uniform patterns in changes in recommendations 
across analysts. The fraction of average downgrades and upgrades around announcement 
dates is not substantially different from those observed in non-announcement periods. 
Overall, we interpret this “lack of reaction” by analysts as being consistent with the hypothesis 
that the transaction on average is “fairly priced” and that stock market prices after the 
announcement reflect all relevant information on the assets. Finally, a note of caution.  
Analysts affiliated with companies acting as financial adviser to the merging firms in each 
transaction can not issue recommendations on the merging companies during the merging 
process. To the extent that these analysts have more information on the likely outcome of the 
merger process, the evidence presented here maybe underestimating the impact on 
expected performance by analysts17. 
                                                                          
16. Similar figures are found when we restrict our analysis to the sample of completed banking deals. 
17. It would also be interesting to analyse whether local analysts, that a priori may have better information, are more 
likely to change their recommendations in reaction to a merger announcement. The idea that local analysts have better 
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4 The Stock Market Reaction of Competing Firms 
The analysis of the stock market reaction of rival companies to merger announcements 
might be useful to identify the underlying rationale for integration deals. The use of 
competitors’ data to determine the ultimate impact on competition from the merger was 
pioneered by Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983). Value creation from M&As arising from 
efficiency gains should result in a negative correlation between excess returns of the merging 
firms and those of their competitors. Efficiency enhancements by a competitor are likely 
to result in a more competitive environment proving more difficult, at least in the short run, 
for existing firms to maintain their profitability. In contrast, to the extent that M&As result in an 
increase in concentration and a decline in the intensity of competition, the stock of competing 
firms should react positively as value to their shareholders will likely increase in the future. 
Moreover, to the extent that domestic deals are more likely to lead to industry consolidation 
and as a result affect market competition, we can expect, on average, higher excess returns 
to the shareholders of rival companies in domestic deals. By contrast, the entry of foreign 
banks, as a result of cross-border deals, may foster competition inducing local banks to 
innovate and improve service quality. As Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) 
shows, foreign ownership of banks is usually negatively correlated with domestically owned 
banks’ profitability and margins. 
Focusing on the analysis of stock market reaction of rival companies limits 
theevaluation of competition to only publicly-traded competitors. In some segments of the 
financial industry –such as retail banking– a substantial share of the market is controlled 
by non-quoted companies (i.e. savings banks or cooperative banks), particularly in certain 
countries. Therefore, in these cases our approach does not capture the competitive impact of 
the merger in a substantial fraction of the competitors. It is also worth mentioning that in 
some countries these non-quoted companies have important limitations on the admissible 
changes in their ownership structure, this being an important obstacle to the integration of 
these market segments at the European level. 
We define the set of competing firms as all the companies belonging to the 
same financial service industry18 listed in the same country as the target company. 
We assume that any impact on competition will likely take place in the market of the 
acquired company. For domestic mergers, this is not controversial since the relevant 
market is the same for the acquirer and target firms. This is not true for international mergers. 
Given the high level of concentration of European financial firms in their domestic markets, 
an international merger usually results in an increase in the geographical scope of the 
acquiring company. In this case, we assume that competition effects, if any, are likely to 
occur in the national market of the target19. 
                                                                                                                                                 
information is supported by Bae et al. (2005) who find that analysts resident in a country make more precise earnings 
forecasts for firms in that country than analysts who are not resident in that country, even after controlling for firm and 
analyst characteristics. See also Malloy (2005) for related evidence. 
18. For this purpose, we consider the following industry segments: Banks (81), Insurance (83), Life Assurance (84), 
Investment companies (85), Speciality and other finance (87). In brackets, we specify the FTSE/HANG SENG indexes 
reference codes. 
19. Note that this assumption will be more adequate in those industries that are geographically segmented 
like retail banking. However, the assumption is less satisfactory in those industry segments that are more integrated or 
where the cross-border service provision is more relevant. 
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For each set of competing firms, we compute the excess return to shareholders 
around the same windows as we did for the firms involved in the M&A transaction20. This 
provides us with a sample of excess returns of competing firms for every transaction. 
Summary statistics for the average of these excess returns are reported in the last 
three columns of Table 2. Overall, we find that average and median excess returns are 
predominantly positive although close to zero. Interestingly, we find that average and median 
excess returns for the announcement window are small but significantly positive, both for 
the total sample and for domestic deals. These results might indicate that merger deals 
have led to a reduction in the level of competition. We also find that long-run average 
excess returns for competing firms are positive, although not statistically significant given 
the wide dispersion across companies. Consistently with the hypothesis of an anticompetitive 
rationale for merger deals, we find that, with the exception of the pre-announcement 
window, domestic deals tend to generate higher excess returns for rival companies than 
cross-border deals, the difference being particularly sizeable for the long-run window. 
In contrast, the comparison of rivals’ excess returns in terms of the size of the deals does not 
offer conclusive results. 
Positive excess returns to competing firms around merger announcements are also 
compatible with increases in the probability that these competing firms may themselves 
become targets of future M&A deals. M&A transactions are clustered over time, and we do 
find evidence in Table 2 of positive excess returns to targets prior to the announcement 
of a transaction. Under this explanation, investors, given the announcement of a transaction, 
would boost valuations of competing firms in the expectation of further transactions at higher 
prices. This explanation relies on a rationale for why further transactions would occur at 
higher prices. Under efficient markets, higher prices can only be supported by the expectation 
of higher future cash-flows for the firms involved. This is precisely the anticompetitive 
hypothesis being tested. 
We also look at the fraction of competitors which display positive abnormal returns, 
over different windows around merger deals announcements. According to the hypothesis of 
increases in market power, we should expect a high fraction of companies displaying positive 
excess returns and this fraction should be lower for cross-border deals. 
Results along this line are reported in Table 5 and the evidence is far from 
conclusive. First, around one half of the competing firms displayed positive excess returns 
over the different horizons. This share is somewhat higher when considering the long-run 
window suggesting that the perception of market power gains associated to the transaction 
is higher as the observation window gets larger. Second, there are not significant differences 
between domestic and cross-border deals in the fraction of rivals with positive abnormal 
returns. If anything, this fraction is higher in domestic transactions around the announcement 
window, favoring the hypothesis of increases in market power. A final interesting feature 
arising from these results is the absence of a uniform reaction of competing firms to 
merger announcements. The fraction of deals in which at least 75% of the rivals display 
positive abnormal returns is low for all windows. 
According to the hypothesis of market power gains, the partial correlation between 
the excess returns of merging firms and those of their competitors should also be positive. 
To test this hypothesis, we regress the estimated excess returns of the merging firms over 
                                                                          
20. Excess returns for competing firms are computed as the difference between the stock market return of each firm 
minus the return of the national stock market index during the same period. 
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the average excess return of their competitors. Our goal in doing this regression is not to 
establish a causal relationship between excess returns of target and competing firms. 
The purpose is exclusively to evaluate to what extent the reported correlation is robust to the 
inclusion of additional controls. We also included a number of other control variables including 
a set of year dummies, a dummy for the geographical scope (DOMESTIC), the relative size of 
the merging firms (RSIZE) and dummies for the top and bottom quartile of absolute size of the 
deal (LARGEDEAL and SMALLDEAL). Results are reported in Table 6. 
We generally find a positive correlation between target excess returns and those of 
their competitors, although it is not significant for the window [t-1, t+1]. Similarly, we also find 
a positive correlation between acquirer excess returns and those of their competitors, 
although it is again not significant for the announcement window [t-1, t+1]. This evidence 
points towards a positive correlation between merging firms’ and rivals’ returns around 
the announcement period. This evidence would be consistent with the hypothesis that market 
power increases as a result of these transactions. 
We would also expect this effect to be more prevalent for domestic than for 
international transactions. We test this hypothesis by including an interaction term between 
the average competitors’ excess return and the dummy for domestic deals (DOM_RIV). 
The evidence is only weakly favorable to this hypothesis. Both for targets and acquirers, the 
interaction term is predominantly positive and it is significant over the long-run window, which 
implies a higher correlation between merging firms’ and rivals’ returns in domestic mergers. 
For the long-run window [t-1, t+360] the correlation between target firms’ and rivals’ excess 
returns is positive and significant for domestic mergers while for cross-border mergers is not 
significant21. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the observed positive correlation between 
excess returns of target and competing firms may be driven by common factors affecting 
the financial industries involved and not related to the transaction. Recall that excess returns 
are computed relative to market returns in each country. The presence of common industry 
trends would result in the observed positive correlation. This is more likely to occur for the 
larger windows considered and may explain the positive correlation for the longer windows 
in Table 6.  By construction this effect is less likely in the shorter windows, where we still find 
the positive correlation. We view this evidence jointly with the significant positive mean excess 
returns for competitors around announcement reported earlier as supportive of the impact 
that the announcement of these transactions has on expected returns to rivals. 
                                                                          
21. We would also expect that the positive correlation between excess returns of merging and competing firms be 
more relevant in larger deals, since larger deals are more likely to have an impact on industry competition. However, 
the interaction between the average competitors’ excess return and the deal size turned out to be unsignificant 
for all the windows. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper has looked at the reaction by industry insiders, industry analysts and competing 
firms, to the announcement of M&As that took place in the European Union financial industry 
in the period 1998-2006. The view that changes in stock market prices around the 
announcement of an M&A deal are a fair reflection of the full value of the merger is a 
key assumption in event studies on value creation of merger processes. We evaluate the 
changes in recommendations by industry analysts as an alternative measure of the expected 
returns generated from the merger. 
Our results indicate that analysts covering firms involved in an M&A transaction 
do not significantly alter their recommendation. Although acquiring firms tend to have 
a slightly better recommendation by analysts, their mean recommendation does not 
change around the announcement of an M&A transaction. Target firms have analysts 
recommendations similar to the average firm in the industry and these recommendations 
are also not significantly altered around the announcement of a transaction. This lack of 
reaction by analysts is consistent with the hypothesis that the transaction on average 
is “fairly priced” and that stock market prices after the announcement reflect all relevant 
information on the assets. 
The paper also analyses the stock market reaction of competing firms around a 
merger announcement. This is an empirical approach that has been often used to assess 
the likely impact of the transaction on competition. By looking at the rivals’ stock market 
reaction we pursue a further analysis of the underlying motives for engaging in an M&A 
process. We find a positive correlation between excess returns of the merging firms and 
those of their competitors, consistent with the idea that market power might have increased 
as a result of these transactions. Moreover, we also find evidence that returns to competing 
firms upon announcement differ between domestic and international mergers. The correlation 
between long-run excess returns for acquirers and competing firms is positive for domestic 
mergers and significantly higher than for international mergers. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that domestic mergers were more likely to decrease industry competition. 
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Targets Acquirers Targets Acquirers
Austria 3 4 1 1
Belgium 5 7 3 4
Denmark 10 7 5 3
Finland 2 1 0 0
France 12 11 9 7
Germany 32 37 18 21
Greece 10 7 7 5
Ireland 2 2 2 2
Italy 44 41 31 31
Luxembourg 2 1 2 0
Netherlands 7 8 3 4
Portugal 14 10 12 7
Spain 11 11 8 11
Sweden 7 11 2 4
UK 57 60 22 25
218 218 125 125
Targets Acquirers Targets Acquirers
Depository institutions 107 119 94 100
Nondepository credit institutions 4 1 4 0
Security, commodity brokers and services 25 19 18 16
Insurance carriers 26 32 0 0
Insurance agents, brokers and services 4 2 0 0
Holding and other investment office 52 45 9 9
218 218 125 125
Number of firms with analysts' data 140 159 84 105
Number of analysts per firm
   Minimum 1 1 1 1
   Maximum 42 47 41 45
   Average 13 19 17 20
Number of deals with information on rivals
Number of rivals per deal
   Minimum
   Maximum
   Average 33
Rivals are those with the same FTAG4 code: Banks (81), Insurance (83), Life Assurance (84), Investment 






Panel B. Breakdown by sector
Panel C. Information on analysts and rivals
208
Table 1. Sample description
Cleaned sample Banking




































Means (1) Medians (2) % positive Means (1) Medians (2) % positive Means (1) Medians (2) % positive
All deals 
(t-90,t-1) 3.74% ** 5.24% ** 60.1% 1.26% 1.28% ** 56.9% -0.62% 0.13% 50.5%
(t-1,t+1) 3.38% ** 0.78% ** 58.3% -0.54% * -0.08% 48.6% 0.58% ** 0.23% ** 57.2%
(t-1,t+30) 1.73% * 0.61% 52.3% -1.46% * -0.56% 44.9% 0.52% 0.28% 52.4%
(t-1,t+360) 1.32% 0.18% 50.5% -1.86% 0.31% 50.7% 0.58% 0.45% 50.3%
N. of deals (3)
Domestic deals 
(t-90,t-1) 3.89% * 6.43% ** 62.3% 1.00% 1.12% 54.7% -1.13% -0.44% 48.4%
(t-1,t+1) 3.22% ** 0.84% ** 59.7% -0.54% 0.23% 51.6% 0.83% ** 0.26% ** 59.5%
(t-1,t+30) 1.64% 0.86% 53.5% -1.96% * -1.19% 43.9% 0.67% 0.22% 52.3%
(t-1,t+360) 3.90% 1.95% 52.4% -1.78% 0.76% 51.0% 1.05% 0.03% 50.0%
N. of deals (3)
Cross-border deals
(t-90,t-1) 3.33% * 2.64% 54.2% 1.95% 1.95% * 62.7% 0.79% 1.18% 56.4%
(t-1,t+1) 3.82% ** 0.32% 54.2% -0.55% -0.27% 40.7% -0.11% 0.08% 50.9%
(t-1,t+30) 1.95% -0.41% 49.2% -0.13% -0.20% 47.5% 0.12% 0.35% 52.7%
(t-1,t+360) -5.33% -3.58% 45.6% -2.06% -0.14% 50.0% -0.68% 0.45% 50.9%
N. of deals (3)
Small deals (4)
(t-90,t-1) 0.05% 1.68% 51.0% 2.26% 2.62% 59.2% -1.33% 0.55% 52.1%
(t-1,t+1) 4.55% ** 0.90% ** 67.3% -1.46% ** -0.46% 42.9% 0.19% 0.19% 56.3%
(t-1,t+30) 1.51% -0.41% 46.9% -2.38% -2.22% 40.8% -0.48% -1.29% 41.7%
(t-1,t+360) -1.10% -7.33% 43.8% -11.34% -1.66% 47.9% -4.51% -10.57% * 36.2%
N. of deals (3)
Large deals (4)
(t-90,t-1) 5.30% ** 6.05% * 63.3% 2.23% 1.56% 59.2% -1.54% 0.27% 51.1%
(t-1,t+1) 1.52% 0.73% 57.1% -0.97% ** -0.33% 40.8% 0.08% 0.33% 55.3%
(t-1,t+30) 0.94% 1.53% 55.1% -0.77% -0.68% 38.8% 0.09% 1.09% 57.4%
(t-1,t+360) 1.97% 3.67% 54.3% 5.96% 7.37% * 66.0% 2.65% 5.26% 56.8%
N. of deals (3)
(1) */** denote significance at the 10%/5% level. Confidence intervals on the distribution of excess returns have been adjusted for skewness following the methods described in Lyon 
et al. (1999).
(2) */** denote significance at the 10%/5% level. 
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(4) Small (large) deals are those included in the lower (upper) quartile of the distribution in terms of the size of the deal, measured by the joint market capitalization of the merging 
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Target Acquirer Target Acquirer
All deals
Mean of average scores 2.59 2.49 2.58 2.51
   p-value (1) 0.31 0.49 0.28 0.36
   p-value (2)






Mean of average scores 2.58 2.51 2.49 2.56
   p-value (1) 0.27 0.38 0.01 0.21
   p-value (2)






Mean of average scores 2.60 2.45 2.78 2.41
   p-value (1) 0.43 0.29 0.04 0.23
   p-value (2)






Mean of average scores 2.62 2.49 2.61 2.49
Median of average scores 2.62 2.49 2.58 2.44
























(1) Null hypothesis: the mean of average scores is equal to the mean of average scores in non-
announcement periods























announcement Targets & Acquirers
Number of observations 117 117 110 136 136 135 17554
No changes 67.5% 70.1% 42.7% 61.8% 64.0% 30.4% 66.9%
Only downgrades 13.7% 9.4% 10.9% 12.5% 9.6% 12.6% 12.3%
% Analysts that downgrade 22.3% 14.1% 18.8% 10.7% 17.6% 32.0% 10.4%
% of deals with at least 20% downgrades 25.0% 18.2% 16.7% 5.9% 23.1% 41.2% 6.6%
% of deals with at least 50% downgrades 12.5% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 7.7% 17.6% 1.2%
Only upgrades 9.4% 11.1% 10.9% 17.6% 15.4% 12.6% 10.9%
% Analysts that upgrade 9.8% 9.7% 21.7% 7.5% 9.7% 13.4% 10.0%
% of deals with at least 20% upgrades 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 4.8% 11.8% 7.0%
% of deals with at least 50% upgrades 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8%
Downgrades & Upgrades 9.4% 9.4% 35.5% 8.1% 11.0% 44.4% 9.9%
% Analysts that downgrade 6.6% 5.1% 15.4% 5.7% 6.7% 11.0% 6.4%
% Analysts that upgrade 6.7% 7.0% 13.3% 6.3% 9.2% 15.5% 6.6%
Recommendations Around announcement
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(t-1,t+1) 0.53 26.4% 52.9%
(t-90, t-1) 0.52 22.1% 47.6%
(t-1, t+30) 0.49 20.7% 44.2%
(t-1, t+360) 0.55 28.8% 51.4%
Domestic deals
(t-1,t+1) 0.55 30.1% 54.9%
(t-90, t-1) 0.52 20.9% 46.4%
(t-1, t+30) 0.49 19.0% 43.8%
(t-1, t+360) 0.55 28.1% 51.0%
Cross-border deals
(t-1,t+1) 0.49 16.4% 47.3%
(t-90, t-1) 0.54 25.5% 50.9%
(t-1, t+30) 0.50 25.5% 45.5%
(t-1, t+360) 0.54 30.9% 52.7%
Table 5 Share of competitors with positive excess returns
(1) Fraction of deals in which at least 75% of the rivals display 
abnormal positive returns
(2) Fraction of deals in which at least 50% of the rivals display 
abnormal positive returns
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Event Window (t-90,t-1) (t-1,t+1) (t-1,t+30) (t-1,t+360) (t-90,t-1) (t-1,t+1) (t-1,t+30) (t-1,t+360)
DOMESTIC 0.037 -0.013 0.008 0.136 0.039 -0.013 0.008 0.115
BANKS -0.045 0.024 0.012 0.034 -0.045 0.024 0.012 0.044
RSIZE -0.107 0.332** 0.328** 0.547 -0.112 0.332** 0.343** 0.46
SMALLDEAL -0.054 0.021 0.011 -0.076 -0.053 0.021 0.010 -0.06
LARGEDEAL 0.038 -0.042* -0.013 0.046 0.041 -0.042* -0.015 0.051
RIVALS_ER 0.581*** 0.072 0.483*** 0.582*** 0.673*** 0.044 0.827*** -0.118
DOM_RIV -0.108 0.028 -0.389 0.867**
INTERCEPT 0.046 -0.004 -0.006 -0.157 0.044 -0.004 -0.007 -0.14
Observations 187 187 187 180 187 187 187 180
R-squared 0.132 0.109 0.133 0.131 0.133 0.109 0.139 0.167
RMSE 0.223 0.119 0.145 0.443 0.224 0.119 0.144 0.435
DOMESTIC 0.009 0.000 -0.013 0.134** 0.008 0.000 -0.013 0.123*
BANKS -0.008 -0.012 -0.001 0.084 -0.008 -0.011 -0.001 0.089
RSIZE 0.059 0.054 0.042 0.887** 0.062 0.054 0.028 0.840**
SMALLDEAL 0.013 -0.016 0.011 -0.115 0.012 -0.015 0.011 -0.105
LARGEDEAL 0.036* -0.007 0.009 0.118* 0.035 -0.006 0.011 0.121*
RIVALS_ER 0.541*** 0.020 0.243* 0.686*** 0.490*** -0.264 -0.085 0.306*
DOM_RIV 0.059 0.289 0.371 0.471**
INTERCEPT 0.020 0.014 0.014 -0.015 0.021 0.013 0.015 -0.006
Observations 187 187 187 180 187 187 187 180
R-squared 0.208 0.079 0.091 0.218 0.208 0.081 0.101 0.228
RMSE 0.154 0.054 0.105 0.420 0.154 0.054 0.105 0.418
Year dummies not reported
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6. Regression analysis of excess returns
Targets
Acquirers
The dependent variable are estimated excess returns around the announcement of the transaction relative to the performance of the
national financial market index, over the window in days indicated in the top of the column. DOMESTIC is a dummy that takes the
value 1 if the transaction involves two companies of the same country. BANKS is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the transaction
involves two banks. RSIZE is defined as: ((tmv/(tmv+amv)-0.5)**2) where tmv and amv denote the market capitalisation of the target
and acquiring companies. SMALLDEAL (LARGEDEAL) is a dummy that take the value of 1 if the joint market capitalization of the
involved companies is in the first(fourth) quartile of the distribution. RIVALS_ER is the average excess returns of the set of potential
competitors and DOM RIV is the interaction of RIVALS ER and DOMESTIC. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS  
WORKING PAPERS1  
0601 ARTURO GALINDO, ALEJANDRO IZQUIERDO AND JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO: Real exchange rates, 
dollarization and industrial employment in Latin America. 
0602 JUAN A. ROJAS AND CARLOS URRUTIA: Social security reform with uninsurable income risk and endogenous 
borrowing constraints. 
0603 CRISTINA BARCELÓ: Housing tenure and labour mobility: a comparison across European countries. 
0604 FRANCISCO DE CASTRO AND PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS: The economic effects of exogenous fiscal 
shocks in Spain: a SVAR approach. 
0605 RICARDO GIMENO AND CARMEN MARTÍNEZ-CARRASCAL: The interaction between house prices and loans 
for house purchase. The Spanish case. 
0606 JAVIER DELGADO, VICENTE SALAS AND JESÚS SAURINA: The joint size and ownership specialization in 
banks’ lending. 
0607 ÓSCAR J. ARCE: Speculative hyperinflations: When can we rule them out? 
0608 PALOMA LÓPEZ-GARCÍA AND SERGIO PUENTE: Business demography in Spain: determinants of firm survival.
0609 JUAN AYUSO AND FERNANDO RESTOY: House prices and rents in Spain: Does the discount factor matter? 
0610 ÓSCAR J. ARCE AND J. DAVID LÓPEZ-SALIDO: House prices, rents, and interest rates under collateral 
constraints. 
0611 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO: Debt sustainability and procyclical fiscal policies in Latin 
America. 
0612 GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, VICENTE SALAS AND JESÚS SAURINA: Credit market competition, collateral 
and firms’ finance. 
0613 ÁNGEL GAVILÁN: Wage inequality, segregation by skill and the price of capital in an assignment model. 
0614 DANIEL PÉREZ, VICENTE SALAS AND JESÚS SAURINA: Earnings and capital management in alternative loan 
loss provision regulatory regimes. 
0615 MARIO IZQUIERDO AND AITOR LACUESTA: Wage inequality in Spain: Recent developments. 
0616 K. C. FUNG, ALICIA GARCÍA-HERRERO, HITOMI IIZAKA AND ALAN SUI: Hard or soft? Institutional reforms and 
infraestructure spending as determinants of foreign direct investment in China. 
0617 JAVIER DÍAZ-CASSOU, ALICIA GARCÍA-HERRERO AND LUIS MOLINA: What kind of capital flows does the IMF 
catalyze and when? 
0618 SERGIO PUENTE: Dynamic stability in repeated games. 
0619 FEDERICO RAVENNA: Vector autoregressions and reduced form representations of DSGE models. 
0620 AITOR LACUESTA: Emigration and human capital: Who leaves, who comes back and what difference does it make?
0621 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND RODRIGO CÉSAR SALVADO: Banks, remittances and financial deepening in 
receiving countries. A model. 
0622 SONIA RUANO-PARDO AND VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS: Morosidad de la deuda empresarial bancaria 
en España, 1992-2003. Modelos de la probabilidad de entrar en mora, del volumen de deuda en mora y del total 
de deuda bancaria, a partir de datos individuales de empresa. 
0623 JUAN AYUSO AND JORGE MARTÍNEZ: Assessing banking competition: an application to the Spanish market 
for (quality-changing) deposits. 
0624 IGNACIO HERNANDO AND MARÍA J. NIETO: Is the Internet delivery channel changing banks’ performance? The 
case of Spanish banks.  
0625 JUAN F. JIMENO, ESTHER MORAL AND LORENA SAIZ: Structural breaks in labor productivity growth: The 
United States vs. the European Union. 
0626 CRISTINA BARCELÓ: A Q-model of labour demand. 
0627 JOSEP M. VILARRUBIA: Neighborhood effects in economic growth. 
0628 NUNO MARTINS AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: Does limited access to mortgage debt explain why young adults 
live with their parents? 
0629 LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ AND IGNACIO HERNANDO: Competition and price adjustment in the euro area. 
0630 FRANCISCO ALONSO, ROBERTO BLANCO AND GONZALO RUBIO: Option-implied preferences adjustments, 
density forecasts, and the equity risk premium.  
                                                           
1. Previously published Working Papers are listed in the Banco de España publications catalogue. 
0631 JAVIER ANDRÉS, PABLO BURRIEL AND ÁNGEL ESTRADA: BEMOD: A dsge model for the Spanish economy 
and the rest of the Euro area. 
0632 JAMES COSTAIN AND MARCEL JANSEN: Employment fluctuations with downward wage rigidity: The role of 
moral hazard. 
0633 RUBÉN SEGURA-CAYUELA: Inefficient policies, inefficient institutions and trade. 
0634 RICARDO GIMENO AND JUAN M. NAVE: Genetic algorithm estimation of interest rate term structure. 
0635 JOSÉ MANUEL CAMPA, JOSÉ M. GONZÁLEZ-MÍNGUEZ AND MARÍA SEBASTIÁ-BARRIEL: Non-linear 
adjustment of import prices in the European Union.  
0636 AITOR ERCE-DOMÍNGUEZ: Using standstills to manage sovereign debt crises. 
0637 ANTON NAKOV: Optimal and simple monetary policy rules with zero floor on the nominal interest rate. 
0638 JOSÉ MANUEL CAMPA AND ÁNGEL GAVILÁN: Current accounts in the euro area: An intertemporal approach. 
0639 FRANCISCO ALONSO, SANTIAGO FORTE AND JOSÉ MANUEL MARQUÉS: Implied default barrier in credit 
default swap premia. (The Spanish original of this publication has the same number.) 
0701 PRAVEEN KUJAL AND JUAN RUIZ: Cost effectiveness of R&D and strategic trade policy. 
0702 MARÍA J. NIETO AND LARRY D. WALL: Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors’ prompt 
corrective action: Is there a case for a banking standard in the EU? 
0703 PHILIP VERMEULEN, DANIEL DIAS, MAARTEN DOSSCHE, ERWAN GAUTIER, IGNACIO HERNANDO, 
ROBERTO SABBATINI AND HARALD STAHL: Price setting in the euro area: Some stylised facts from individual 
producer price data. 
0704 ROBERTO BLANCO AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Have real interest rates really fallen that much in Spain? 
0705 OLYMPIA BOVER AND JUAN F. JIMENO: House prices and employment reallocation: International evidence. 
0706 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND JOSÉ M.ª SERENA: Global financial integration, monetary policy and reserve 
accumulation. Assessing the limits in emerging economies. 
0707 ÁNGEL LEÓN, JAVIER MENCÍA AND ENRIQUE SENTANA: Parametric properties of semi-nonparametric 
distributions, with applications to option valuation. 
0708 DANIEL NAVIA AND ENRIQUE ALBEROLA: Equilibrium exchange rates in new EU members: external 
imbalances vs. real convergence. 
0709 GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ AND JAVIER MENCÍA: Modelling the distribution of credit losses with observable and latent 
factors. 
0710 JAVIER ANDRÉS, RAFAEL DOMÉNECH AND ANTONIO FATÁS: The stabilizing role of government size. 
0711 ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER, VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS AND JESÚS SAURINA: Measurement of capital stock 
and input services of Spanish banks. 
0712 JESÚS SAURINA AND CARLOS TRUCHARTE: An assessment of Basel II procyclicality in mortgage portfolios. 








Alcalá, 522; 28027 Madrid
Telephone +34 91 338 6363. Fax +34 91 338 6488
e-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
